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THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND THE FREE 
MOVEMENT OF CIVIL JUDGMENTS
Jan-Jaap Kuipers*
Summary: This paper analyses the role and function of the right to a 
fair trial in Brussels I. Particular emphasis will be placed on how the 
European Court of Justice balances the right to a fair trial against the 
free movement of judgments. This question will be answered in terms 
of whether the ECJ perceives the right to a fair trial to constitute an 
autonomous source of obligations or whether it interprets (and if so, 
how it does so) PIL mechanisms in the light of the requirements of a 
fair trial. In particular, the paper will analyse to what extent the courts 
in the Member State addressed may review compliance with the right 
to a fair hearing of the court originally seized. Finally, the proposal of 
the European Commission to abolish the exequatur will be examined 
from a fundamental rights perspective.
Introduction
The grounds for jurisdiction have traditionally differed widely betwe-
en the Member States. It was recognised that the accomplishment of an 
internal market could only be achieved when adequate legal protecti-
on was ensured throughout the Union.1 Art 220 EEC therefore allowed 
Member States to enter into negotiations with each other with a view to 
securing for the benefit of their nationals the simplification of formalities 
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of 
courts or tribunals. Recognition addresses the acceptance that the court 
of origin has validly determined the rights and obligations of the parties. 
Enforcement entails making the judgment effective. The creditor will have 
access to all enforcement remedies as if the judgment had been obtained 
in the Member State of recognition. Art 220 EEC resulted in the Brusse-
ls Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (1968). To further facilitate the working of the 
common market, the Convention also adopted uniform grounds of juris-
*	 Jan-Jaap Kuipers is a PhD candidate at the European University Institute in Florence 
(Italy).
1	 Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (1979) Jenard Report, OJ C59 3.
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diction. In an additional protocol, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
was awarded the power of interpretation.2
Following the conferral of powers upon the Community to act in 
the area of PIL in the Amsterdam Treaty,3 the Brussels Convention was 
transformed into the Brussels I Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Reco-
gnition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(44/2001). Despite several problematic areas,4 the functioning of Bru-
ssels I is generally satisfactory. In April 2009, the Commission launched 
a Green Paper for the revision of Brussels I in order to trigger broad 
consultation among interested parties on possible ways to improve the 
operation of the Regulation.5
The general rule of Brussels I is that a person shall be sued in the 
courts of the Member State where he is domiciled. Special rules on juris-
diction are available for specific types of actions. For example, an action 
relating to a tort can be brought in the courts of the Member State where 
the damage occurred, or, in an action involving a number of defendants, 
the defendant could be sued in the courts of the place where any one of 
them is domiciled. Moreover, a number of exclusive jurisdiction rules 
deviate from the main rule. An example is that proceedings relating to 
a right in rem in an immovable property are to be brought in the courts 
of the country where the immovable is situated. The uniform grounds of 
jurisdiction prevent courts from assuming exorbitant jurisdiction which 
facilitates the mutual trust between the courts of the Member States. 
The mutual trust, as well as the legal certainty that Brussels I aims to 
promote, justify only a limited review of judgments rendered by a court in 
another Member State.
2	 Protocol concerning the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the convention of 27 
September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (signed in Luxembourg on 3 June 1971) [1975] OJ L 204 28.
3	 Art 65 EC replaced two articles adopted in 1991 on judicial co-operation in civil matters 
providing for the legal basis for the negotiation and adoption of PIL conventions in Title VI 
of the EU Treaty. On the gradual transformation of EU competences and influence of Union 
law upon PIL, see K Boele-Woelki, ‘Unification and Harmonization of Private International 
Law in Europe’ in J Basedow and others (eds), Private Law in the International Arena: Liber 
Amicorum Kurt Siehr (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2000) 61-78; J Basedow, ‘The Commu-
nitarisation of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam’ (2000) 37 (3) CML Rev; 
M Bogdan, Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law (Europa Law Publishing, 
Groningen 2006) 6-14.
4	 T Hartley, ‘The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common Law of 
Conflict of Laws’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 813-828; J Harris ‘Understanding the English Response to 
the Europeanisation of Private International Law’(2008) 4 (3) Journal of Private Internatio-
nal Law 347-395.  
5	 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters COM 
(2009) 175 final.
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The special rules on jurisdiction create the possibility that a defen-
dant is not sued in the courts where he is domiciled. An example is a 
Finnish tourist causing a traffic accident in Sweden. The place where the 
damage has occurred does not coincide with the place where the defen-
dant is domiciled. A defendant may therefore have to travel to another 
Member State to represent himself in court. This will not always be possi-
ble, or the defendant may not even be aware that legal proceedings aga-
inst him have commenced in that other Member State. If a judgment is 
awarded against the defendant and if we assume that most of his assets 
will be located in the Member State where he is domiciled, the judgment 
still has to be enforced in that Member State. The purpose of this paper 
is to analyse the role and function of the right to a fair trial in Brussels I. 
First, the core features of the Brussels I system will be explained. Then, 
an assessment will be made of how the European Court of Justice balan-
ces the right to a fair trial against the free movement of judgments. Does 
the ECJ perceive the right to a fair trial to constitute an autonomous 
source of obligations or does the Court interpret (and if so, how does it do 
so?) the PIL mechanisms in the light of the requirements of a fair trial? In 
particular, to what extent may the courts in the Member State addressed 
review compliance with the right to a fair hearing of the court originally 
seized? Finally, the proposal of the European Commission to abolish the 
exequatur will be analysed from a fundamental rights perspective.
The right to a fair trial
Brussels I is a specific implementation of the area of freedom, se-
curity and justice which is ultimately aimed at guaranteeing legal pro-
tection to European citizens. The instrument in itself therefore already 
contributes to safeguarding the right to an effective judicial remedy.6 
However, Brussels I needs to reconcile different interests. Art 36 Brussels 
I expressly provides that under no circumstances may a foreign decision 
be reviewed as to its substance. Strict prohibition is necessary from the 
perspective of a common European justice area. In order to promote the 
smooth circulation of judgments, a judgment should be challenged in the 
Member State of origin. Review as to the merits of the judgment would 
de facto create another possibility of appeal. A court may thus not verify 
whether the court in the Member State of origin has succeeded in striking 
a fair balance in, for example, the protection of the freedom of expression 
6	 A Borrás, ‘Le droit international privé communautaire: réalités, problèmes et perspec-
tives d’avenir’ (2005) 317 Recueil des Cours 323-526. K Lenaerts, ‘The Contribution of the 
European Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2010) 59 (2) ICLQ 
255-301.
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or whether it took due account of the right to family life.7 Review should 
not be directed at assessing whether the original court made the ‘right’ 
decision, but whether the defendant was afforded an effective possibility 
to persuade the original court of his point of view. The role that the ECHR 
could play is therefore primarily limited to the procedure. 
In essence, the regime for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments aims to strike a balance between the protection of the rights 
of defence and facilitation of the free movement of judgments within the 
common European justice area. In the words of AG Kokott:
The procedure for authorising enforcement forms part of an overall 
system established by the (Brussels, JJK) Convention which seeks to 
strike a balance between the free movement of judgments in civil and 
commercial cases and the protection of the rights of the defence. The 
rights of defence of the party against whom enforcement is sought 
are protected by the general principle of Community law recognised 
by the Court that everyone is entitled to fair legal process. This prin-
ciple is guided by Article 6 of the ECHR and is reflected in Article 47 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.8
The ECJ thus draws particular inspiration from art 6 ECHR. An 
analysis of the precise protection afforded under this provision to indivi-
duals is beyond the scope of this paper.9 It will be preferred to make spe-
cific references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) whenever this appears to be useful. The ECtHR has pronounced 
itself on several occasions on recognition and enforcement proceedings. 
In K v Italy, the ECtHR found Italy in breach of its obligations under the 
Convention because it failed within a reasonable period of time to render 
a decision on the enforcement of a Polish maintenance judgment.10 Reco-
gnition and enforcement proceedings thus are also bound to comply with 
the fair trial standards.
7	 In extreme cases the recognition or enforcement of a decision may violate public policy. 
That could occur in cases of flagrant violation of a substantive fundamental right. The aut-
hor has not been able to retrieve, with the exception of the right to a fair trial, any cases 
refusing the enforcement of a judgment on the basis of a substantive fundamental right. 
8	 AG Kokott in case C-3/05 Verdoliva [2006] ECR I-1579, para 39.
9	 See P van Dijk and others (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (4th edn, Intersentia, Antwerp 2006) 511-650; R Grote and T Marauhn (eds), 
EMRK/GG: Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtschutz 
(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006) 642-719; M Janis and others (eds), European Human Rights 
Law: Text and Materials (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 718-826; K Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn,  Sweet and Maxwell, London 2008), 63-
214; D Harris and others (eds), Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, 
OUP) 201-330.
10  K v Italy (App no 38805/97) ECHR 2004-VIII.
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In Pelligrini, a husband initiated proceedings for the annulment of a 
marriage before the ecclesiastical courts of the Holy See.11 The wife was 
only informed of the content of the action when she appeared before the 
court and, moreover, the ecclesiastical court had not informed the wife 
of her right to legal representation. A judgment was awarded in favour of 
the husband, of which he subsequently sought recognition in Italy. Italy 
was found to be in breach of its obligations under art 6 because it failed 
to verify the compliance of the proceedings in the court of origin with the 
guarantees of art 6. The ECtHR appears to have departed in Pelligrini 
from its main rule that the Convention can only trigger the responsibi-
lity of Contracting Parties for acts committed in a non-Contracting Party 
in the case of a flagrant violation of the Convention.12 The reasoning of 
the ECtHR implies that the right to a fair trial is an autonomous source 
of obligations, imposing an obligation for Contracting States to refuse a 
judgment handed down in violation of the right to a fair trial, rather than 
that the principle guides the interpretation of traditional PIL notions, 
such as public policy, in the light of fair trial standards.
Pelligrini is a dangerous decision. In particular, one wonders whether 
in all circumstances the failure of a state to guarantee the right to a 
fair trial to an individual can stand in the way of the recognition of the 
subsequent decision in a dispute between two private parties.13 Should 
the husband in Pelligrini have insisted that the wife be properly notified 
and represented in court, or could he have relied for that purpose upon 
the procedural law of the Holy See? Adversarial proceedings require that 
each party acts in what it perceives to be its best interest and there is no 
general duty of charity. The obligation of Italy not to recognise a judgment 
impedes the rights of the husband who might not have been under an 
obligation, or even in a position, to safeguard the rights of defence of his 
wife. It might have been better to leave the question of enforcement to the 
public policy of the Contracting States, as inspired by the requirements 
of art 6. 
11 Pellegrini v Italy (App no 30882/96) ECHR 2001-VIII. 
12 Soering v United Kingdom (App no 14038/88) ECHR 7 July 1989); Drozd and Janou-
sek v France and Spain (App no 12747/87) ECHR 26 June 1992; Bader v Sweden (App 
no 13284/04) ECHR 8 November 2005; Mamatkulov v Turkey (2005) (App no 46827/99 
and 46951/99) ECHR 4 February 2005; Maumousseau and Washington v France (App no 
39388/05) ECHR 6 December 2007.
13 The values enshrined in the Convention may be common to the Contracting Parties, but 
are not necessarily universal. The international harmony of decisions, legal pluralism and 
mutual tolerance require restraint with the pursuance of ‘home values’ on the international 
level. In PIL this is referred to as ‘relativisme des valeurs’. See L Gannage, ‘L’ordre public 
international a l’épreuve du relativisme des valeurs (2009) Travaux du comité Français de 
Droit International Privé 2006-2008, 205-241.
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It is therefore not surprising that national courts have sought to 
distinguish Pelligrini.14 Pelligrini concerned a judgment from a non-Con-
tracting State. A presumption that a judgment complies with art 6 will 
exist when the judgment originates from another Contracting State.15 Mo-
reover, contrary to violations in a non-Contracting State, an individual 
has the possibility to seek redress against the violation of art 6 in the 
original procedure by means of launching an individual complaint before 
the ECtHR. It thus appears that Pelligrini is limited to judgments from 
non-Contracting States.16
The duty to recognise in Brussels I
From the perspective of Brussels I, a distinction should be drawn 
on the basis of whether or not the original judgment is pronounced in a 
Member State of the Union. Brussels I can only confer jurisdiction upon 
a court established in a Member State. Whenever the defendant is not 
domiciled in one of the Member States, Brussels I is not applicable.17 Ju-
risdiction in disputes involving a defendant not domiciled in one of the 
Member States can resort from international conventions concluded by 
the Union18 or from national law. Similarly, the duty to recognise a forei-
gn decision is limited to judgments rendered in another Member State. 
The recognition of judgments coming from a third country is left to be 
governed by international conventions and national law. The decision to 
recognise a third country judgment in a Member State does not affect the 
14 English courts have distinguished Pelligrini through the specific relationship between 
the Holy See and Italy governed by a concordat. The Pelligrini rule was therefore limited to 
the factual circumstances of that specific case. See critically J Fawcett, ‘The Impact of Art. 
6 (1) of the ECHR on Private International Law’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 1, 23.
15 P Kinsch, ‘The Impact of Human Rights on the Application of Foreign Law and on the 
Recognition of Foreign Judgments: A Survey of the Cases Decided by the European Human 
Rights Institutions’ in T Einhorn and K Siehr (eds), International Cooperation Through Priva-
te International Law: Essays in Memory of Peter E. Nygh (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2004) 
197-228; and more elaborately P Kinsch, ‘Droits de l’homme, droits fondamentaux et droit 
international privé’ (2005) 318 Recueil des Cours 19, 325.
16 For a contrary view, see B Juratowitch, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights 
and English Private International Law’ (2007) 3 (1) Journal of Private International Law 
173-199. Juratowitch focuses on the independent responsibility of the state responsible 
for the act of facilitating or ratifying a breach of ECHR standards. From this perspective 
it does not matter whether a state is a contracting party or not since what is considered 
is the conduct of the state giving effect to the breach. The test on compliance proposed by 
Juratowitch is not confined to flagrant violations.
17 Save for arts 22 and 23 dealing with the grounds for exclusive jurisdiction and the choice 
of court.
18 J Kuipers, ‘The Exclusive Competence of the Union under art. 81 TFEU: Lugano re-
opened?’ in M Cremona, J Monar and S Poli (eds), The External Dimension of the Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice (forthcoming).
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recognition of the identical decision in another Member State. Exequatur 
sur exequatur ne vaut. Contrary to the free movement of goods, where an 
imported good benefits from free circulation as soon as it has lawfully 
entered a Member State, there is no free circulation of judgments. The 
decision of Italy to recognise or not a decision from Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines did not in any way affect the position of a UK court.19 Any 
refusal to recognise or enforce a judgment pronounced in a third country 
will therefore not conflict with the system established by Brussels I, since 
third country judgments do a priori not benefit from the free circulation 
of judgments.
The Pelligrini obligation to verify the compliance of the court of ori-
gin with the right to a fair trial does therefore not conflict with the free 
movement of judgments under Brussels I. Every Member State of the 
European Union is a Contracting Party to the ECHR. Judgments from 
non-Contracting Parties to the ECHR are outside the system of facilita-
ted recognition of Brussels I. The question, however, remains whether 
a judgment that raises fair trial concerns could be liable for recognition 
under the system of Brussels I. Of importance is that the construction 
of what a Member State considers to be its public policy is no longer a 
strictly unilateral exercise. The Union seems to develop a core of rules 
that will enter the notion of public policy in the Member States. Funda-
mental rights could become part of that EU public policy. On the other 
hand, an obligation to refuse to recognise a decision that violates art 6 
ECHR may conflict with the free circulation of judgments within the Uni-
on as protected by Brussels I.
Let us first focus on the concept of the free movement of judgments. 
The core of the free movement of judgments are articles 33 and 38 Bru-
ssels I. Art 33 (1) provides that ‘a judgment given in a Member State shall 
be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure 
being required’, and art 38 (1) determines that a ‘judgment given in a 
Member State and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in another 
Member State when, on the application of any interested party, it has 
been declared enforceable there’.20 The effects of the judgment are not 
19 Case C-129/92 Owens Bank Ltd v Fulvio Bracco [1994] ECR I-117. 
20 P Kaye, Civil Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Professional Books Li-
mited, Abingdon 1987); J Kropholler, ‘Europäisches Zivilprozeßrecht (7. Auflage, Verlag 
Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg 2001); E Pataut, ‘L’exécution des jugements nationaux 
et la convention de Bruxelles’ in Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, Faculté de Droit, Centre 
d’Etudes Européennes (ed), Les effets des jugements nationaux dans les autres États mem-
bres de l’Union européenne (Bruylant, Brussels 2001) 31-53; S Carbone, Lo spazio giudi-
zaiario europeo in material civile e commercial: Da Bruxelles I al regolamento CE n. 805/2004’ 
(G Giappichelli Editore, Torino 2006) 227-297; U Magnus and P Mankowski (eds), Brussels 
I Regulation (Sellier, München  2007); M Berglund, Cross-Border Enforcement of Claims in 
the EU: History, Present Time and Future (Kluwer Law International, Deventer 2009).
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determined by the recognising court, but by the country of origin.21 There 
is no requirement that the judgment should be final or conclusive. Pro-
visional and protective measures are also covered. It is sufficient that a 
judgment is provisionally enforceable in the Member State of origin, even 
when the judgment is still open to appeal.22 Equally, it does not matter 
whether jurisdiction is assumed on the basis of Brussels I. Even if the 
national court assumed jurisdiction upon the basis of a national rule, 
the recognition and enforcement of that decision falls within the scope of 
Brussels I.23 
A judgment from a Member State does not have automatic legal for-
ce in other Member States. An application of an interested party for the 
enforcement of the original judgment is required. The judgment of the 
recognising court granting enforcement is referred to as an exequatur. 
The exequatur shall be granted upon a copy of the judgment which sa-
tisfies the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity (art 41). The 
decision concerning the grant of an exequatur may be appealed by either 
party. It is only on appeal that the recognising court may test the original 
judgment. The accelerated exequatur procedure is rather efficient, since 
only between 1 – 5% of the declarations on enforceability are appealed.24 
An exequatur can only be refused or revoked for the reasons provided for 
in Brussels I. Art 45 refers back to the grounds to refuse to recognise the 
original judgment. Art 34 provides:25
A judgment shall not be recognised:
1. if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the 
Member State in which recognition is sought;
21 Case 145/86 Hoffmann v Krieg [1987] ECR 645.
22 Under art 37 and 46 the court before which recognition and enforcement is sought may 
stay the proceedings if an actual appeal against the original judgment has been lodged.
23 Note, however, that the general limitation in the scope of Brussels I is still applicable. A 
judgment should therefore fall within the scope of art 1. Joined Cases 9 and 10/77 Bavaria 
Fluggesellschaft v Eurocontrol [1977] ECR 1517.
24 B Hess, T Pfeiffer and P Schlosser, The Brussels I Regulation: Application and Enforce-
ment in the EU (Verlag CH Beck, München 2008) 127. The exequatur procedure is accele-
rated because outside the framework of Brussels I exequatur is considered in contradictory 
proceedings.
25 The forerunner of art 34, art. 27 Brussels Convention, contained another ground: ‘if the 
court of the State of origin, in order to arrive at its judgment, has decided a preliminary 
question concerning the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property ari-
sing out of a matrimonial relationship, wills or succession in a way that conflicts with a rule 
of the private international law of the State in which the recognition is sought, unless the 
same result would have been reached by the application of the rules of private international 
law of that State’. That ground has been abolished in the light of the unification of the con-
flict of law rules by the Union and the accompanying power of interpretation of the ECJ.
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2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was 
not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or 
with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as 
to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed 
to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was 
possible for him to do so;
3. if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between 
the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is sought;
4. if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another 
Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action 
and between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment 
fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member 
State addressed.
The reasons for refusal are in principle exhaustive. However, the re-
cognising court remains bound by limitations imposed by public interna-
tional law. If, for example, state immunity was not respected in the court 
of origin, the resulting judgment would not be entitled to recognition in 
other Member States.26 A more elegant solution is available. Questions 
involving the immunity of foreign powers will most often fall outside the 
scope of Brussels I. Hence, civil matters did not cover a legal action bro-
ught by natural persons in Greece against Germany for compensation in 
respect of the loss or damage suffered by the successors of the victims of 
acts perpetrated by German armed forces during the Second World War 
in Greece.27
With regard to the grounds provided for by art 34, of particular im-
portance is that, with the limited exception of jurisdiction relating to in-
surance and consumer contracts and exclusive grounds for jurisdiction, 
the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin may not be 
reviewed (art 35). The assumption is that a court of one Member State is 
never in a better position to determine whether the court of another Mem-
ber State has jurisdiction than the original court itself.28 A court may thus 
26 Magnus & Mankowski (n 20) 559.
27 Case C-292/05 Lechouritou [2007] ECR 1519. See also: Άρειος Πάγος (Greek Civil Su-
preme Court) 1 October 2007, 1857/2007 holding that the structure of Brussels I which 
prevented its application in respect of acts of sovereign states that did not fall into its re-
gime was not contrary to the rules of public international law. In this respect, it must also 
be noted that the Court of Appeals of The Hague held that the award of immunity to the 
United Nations for allegedly negligent conduct surrounding the genocide in Srebrenica did 
not breach art 6 EHRM since the applicants could still pursue their claim against either 
the Dutch State in the Netherlands (the applicants alleged similar negligent conduct on the 
part of the Dutch State) or the perpetrators of the genocide. Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage (30 
March 2010) LJN BL8979.
28 Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance and Others [1991] ECR I-3317, para 23; Case 
C-185/07 West Tankers [2009] ECR I-0000, para 29.
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not refuse to recognise a decision on the grounds that the original court 
misapplied Brussels I and was not competent to hear the case.
The third and fourth grounds for refusal do not raise any particu-
lar fundamental rights issues. These grounds relate to the smooth func-
tioning of a common European Justice Area rather than the protecti-
on of individual parties. They deal with the possibility of irreconcilable 
judgments within the Union. Two judgments are irreconcilable if they 
entail legal consequences that are mutually exclusive.29 The recognising 
court will give priority to a judgment pronounced in its own jurisdicti-
on, while in the case of two conflicting foreign judgments with the same 
cause of action, priority is awarded to the judgment that was rendered 
earlier. The risk of conflicting judgments having legal force in a Member 
State is for a large part already avoided at an earlier stage in the procee-
dings. A court is required to stay proceedings when a case involving the 
same cause of action and between the same parties has already been bro-
ught in the courts of another Member State (lis pendens).30 An additional 
mechanism might be suitable for the situation where a court is not aware 
of foreign proceedings, a situation that might especially arise in default 
proceedings. Moreover, art 34 (3) and (4) are wider than the lis pendens 
rule because the provisions also cover disputes outside the scope of Bru-
ssels I.31 In addition, sub (4) allows a court to refuse recognition on the 
grounds of irreconcilability with an earlier judgment from a third country 
that fulfils all the conditions for recognition in the Member State before 
which court recognition has been sought.
Brussels I and the right to a fair trial
Before assessing the possibility of refusing to recognise or enfor-
ce a foreign decision on the grounds of the non-observation of fair trial 
standards, it should be observed that the right to a fair trial is not only 
guaranteed via the possibility to refuse to recognise or enforce a forei-
gn decision, but is interwoven in the doctrinal framework of Brussels 
I. Whereas the ECtHR leaves it primarily upon national law to define 
whether a tribunal is established by law and fulfils the characteristics 
29 Case 145/86 Hoffmann v Krieg [1988] ECR 645, para 22.
30 Art 27 Brussels I. The avoidance of risk of conflicting judgments also means that a party 
in whose favour a judgment is rendered cannot commence fresh proceedings in another 
Member State instead of requesting an exequatur, even if fresh proceedings would entail 
less procedural costs. Case 42/76 De Wolf v Harry Cox [1976] ECR 1759.
31 The situation of conflicting judgments could, for example, arise when an action is dec-
lared civil in one Member State, but criminal in the other. See Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi 
Justiţie a României (Romanian Supreme Court) (3 May 2007) 3542/2007.
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of a court,32 the ECJ has developed, via an autonomous interpretation of 
the notion ‘judgment’, requirements regarding the characteristics of the 
court. From the outset, it must be observed that Brussels I does not con-
tain a definition of what constitutes a court or tribunal. However, in Solo 
Kleinmotoren, the ECJ held that for a judicial decision to be a judgment 
for the purposes of Brussels I, ‘the decision in question must emanate 
from a judicial body of a Member State deciding on its own authority on 
the issues between the parties.’33 Where the ECtHR would have found 
a violation of the standards of art 6 ECHR when, for example, the Sofia 
City Court was bound to follow the assessment of the Bulgarian National 
Bank concerning the solvability of a bank in the context of bankruptcy 
proceedings,34 the ECJ would probably have held that the decision fell 
outside the framework of Brussels I35 because the Sofia City Court did 
not decide the case on its own authority. It has been argued that an 
English default judgment would also fall outside the scope of Brussels 
I since under English law the plaintiffs’ claim would be accepted by the 
English court without any further examination.36 In this interpretation, 
the requirements of independence and due process are read into the de-
finition of judgment. However, Solo Kleinmotoren could also be read more 
restrictively. Brussels I does not apply to a settlement merely recorded 
by the court, since a settlement depends on the intention of the parties 
and not of the court. This would not apply to a default claim,37 even if the 
court does not enter into a substantive examination, since that does not 
deprive the judgment of its character and becomes a mere recording of 
the parties’ intention.38 The ECJ has recently clarified in Gambazzi that 
the latter position prevails.39
32 Terra Woningen BV v The Netherlands (App no 20641/92) ECHR 1996; Chevrol v. France 
(App no 49636/99) ECHR 2003; Chaudet v France (2009) (App no 49037/06) ECHR 2009.
33 Case C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren [1994] ECR I-2237, para 17.
34 Capital Bank v Bulgaria (App no 49429/99) ECHR 2006.
35 Note that the decision, because it relates to bankruptcy, would already fall outside the 
ratione materiae of Brussels I (art 1 (2b)).
36 G Cuniberti, ‘Annotation to Cour de Cassation 17 November 1999’ (2000) 89 Revue 
Critique de Droit International Privé 786-792; A Layton and H Mercer (eds), European Civil 
Practice (2nd  edn, Sweet and Maxwell, London 2004) para 25.005.
37 French Cour de Cassation 17 November 1999. A French defendant was confronted with 
a writ of summons which was followed by a default judgment. The CdC refused to enforce 
the writ of summons, but implied it would have been willing to enforce the English default 
judgment. See Cuniberti (n 36) 786-792.
38 AG Kokott in Case C-394/07 Gambazzi [2009] ECR I-0000, paras 26 and 27.
39 Case C-394/07 Gambazzi [2009] ECR I-0000, para 25. See G Cuniberti, ‘La reconna-
issance en France des jugements par défaut anglais (à propos de l’affaire Gambazzi-Stol-
zenberg)’ (2009) 98 (4) Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 685-714; G Cuniberti, 
‘Debarment from Defending : Default Judgments and Public Policy’ (2010) (30 (2) IPRax 
148-153.
34 Jan-Jaap Kuipers: The Right to a Fair Trial and the Free Movement...
The ECJ held in Denilauler that a judgment relating to provisional 
and protective measures fell outside the scope of the Brussels I regime 
insofar as it was delivered without the summoning of that party against 
which the measures had been awarded and where the measures were 
intended to be enforced without prior service.40 The case concerned a 
French order to freeze a bank account of the debtor held in Frankfurt 
am Main. Under French law, such a seizing order was possible without 
the prior service of documents initiating the legal action on the debtor. 
The ECJ held that the liberal regime of recognition and enforcement was 
only possible because of the protection afforded to the defendant in the 
original proceedings. The Brussels regime would thus only apply to ad-
versarial proceedings where the defendant had the possibility to make an 
appearance before the court. It is not necessary for both parties to have 
the opportunity to participate in the initial phase of the proceedings. The 
requirement of adversarial proceedings will be fulfilled if the parties have 
the possibility to launch an appeal and if they can participate in that 
procedure.41 Dutch Hoge Raad was therefore willing to enforce a German 
‘einstweilige Verfügung’ as well as a ‘Kostenfestsetzungsbeschluss’ that 
had been ordered without hearing the defendant, but in the case where 
the defendant could challenge both decisions after the proper service of 
documents.42 The German Bundesgerichtshof appears to have taken a 
different approach. It refused in 2006 to enforce a Swedish arrestment 
which had been ordered without a preliminary hearing of the German 
defendant.43 In any case, proceedings where the defendant is not awarded 
the possibility to participate in the proceedings, which could result in a 
violation of the right to a fair hearing, are therefore automatically exclu-
ded from the facilitated recognition and enforcement procedure.
Aspects protected under art 6 (1) ECHR such as the requirements 
aimed at guaranteeing the effective participation of both parties in adver-
sarial proceedings are therefore partly already safeguarded by the exclu-
sion of judgments where the court does not decide an issue on its own 
authority or where one of the parties has no formal possibility to partici-
pate in the proceedings. 
40 Case 125/79 Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frères [1980] ECR 1533. The question remains 
whether recognition may be possible under national law.
41 Case C-474/93 Hengst Import [1995] ECR I-2113, para 14; Case C-39/02 Maersk Olie & 
Gas v Firma de Haan [2004] ECR I-9647, para 51.
42 Hoge Raad (7 November 2008) BD7584 (Realchemie). See also Hoge Raad (29 September 
2006) AX3080 (B&N Nordsjöfrakt and Northsea Shipping v Westereems).
43 BGH (21 December 2006) IX ZB 150/05. The decision is criticised in the Heidelberg Re-
port (see Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (n 24)) 135.
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Presence or representation in court: default of appearance and irre-
gular service of documents initiating the procedure
Art 34 (2) Brussels I recognises the fundamental importance of ad-
versarial proceedings. A judgment given in default of appearance will only 
be recognised or enforced when the defendant was served with the docu-
ment instituting the proceedings in a way to enable him to arrange for 
his defence.44 Art 34 (2) does not deal with the formal (im)possibility to 
participate in a proceeding, but rather relates to the effective (im)possibi-
lity. The service of documents which instituted the procedure enables the 
defendant to organise his defence before the foreign court. The ECJ has 
adopted an autonomous concept of default of appearance. Regardless 
of national procedural law, the ECJ will qualify a proceeding as default 
when it is initiated against a person without his knowledge, even when a 
lawyer was assigned to him. In such circumstances, the defendant rema-
ins powerless to defend himself, a defect that cannot be cured by a lawyer 
acting without his authority.45 
Art 34 (2) is to be interpreted narrowly. The strict requirements for 
the refusal to recognise a judicial decision pronounced in another Mem-
ber State is justified for two reasons. The first is to prevent procedural 
opportunism. A party should not be allowed to delay the procedure when 
he is aware that proceedings against him have been launched in another 
Member State and he is in a position to adequately prepare his defence.46 
Relying in such circumstances on a procedural error would defeat the 
purpose of the provision.
The second reason is that the defendant is already protected at an 
earlier stage of the proceedings. Art 26 (1) Brussels I requires a court of 
its own motion to declare it has no jurisdiction when a defendant domi-
ciled in one Member State is sued in a court of another Member State 
and does not enter an appearance, unless its jurisdiction is derived from 
Brussels I. Art 26 (2) requires the court to ‘stay the proceedings so long as 
it is not shown that the defendant has been able to receive the document 
instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time 
to enable him to arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps have 
been taken to this end.’ A special regime is applicable when the document 
initiating the proceedings has been transmitted pursuant to Regulation 
1348/2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extraju-
dicial documents in civil or commercial matters. The Service Regulation 
44 The national procedural requirements for default in appearance are described in C Crifò, 
Cross-border Enforcement of Debts in the European Union: Default Judgments, Summary 
Judgments and Orders for Payment (Kluwer Law International, Deventer 2009) 151-254.
45 Case C-78/95 Hendrikman [1996] ECR I-4943. 
46 Case C-183/90 Van Dalfsen and others v Van Loon and Berendsen [1991] ECR I-04743.
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contributes to the safeguarding of the right of defence by establishing 
guarantees for a proper cross-border service of documents. Under art 
19 of that Regulation, a judgment may not be given until the court has 
ascertained that either the document has been served in accordance with 
the procedural law of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled 
or that the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his 
residence by another method provided for by the Service Regulation. In 
both circumstances, the service or delivery should have been effected in 
a manner to allow the defendant sufficient time to enable him to prepare 
a defence.
The Service Regulation itself is interpreted in the context of guaran-
teeing the effective participation of parties in adversarial proceedings. 
The document served should be drafted in the language of the Member 
State addressed or in a language that the defendant understands.47 The 
addressee cannot refuse to accept the document if it enables him to as-
sert his rights in legal proceedings in the Member State of transmission. 
This is the case even where annexes are attached to the document insti-
tuting proceedings consisting of documentary evidence which is not in 
the language of the Member State addressed or in a language of the Mem-
ber State of transmission which the addressee understands, but which 
has a purely evidential function and is not necessary for understanding 
the subject matter of the claim and the cause of action.48 
Art 34 (2) fulfils a complementary role to art 26. Firstly, the scope 
of art 34 (2) is broader since, unlike art 26, the former article is not limi-
ted to defendants domiciled in another Member State. Secondly, art 34 
(2) allows the Member State in which recognition is sought to establish 
whether the document instituting the proceedings has been duly served 
according to its rules. Both the original court and the court before which 
recognition is sought thus have jurisdiction to determine whether the 
document instituting the proceedings has been properly served.49 In addi-
tion, art 34 (2) is interpreted in the light of the fair trial requirements. A 
defendant may not rely upon this ground for refusal to recognise a deci-
47 P Franzina, ‘Translation Requirements under the EC Service Regulation: The Weiss und 
Partner Decision of the ECJ’ (2008) X Ybk Private Intl L 565-577.
48 Case C-14/07 Weiss und Partner [2008] ECR I-3367. 
49 Case 228/81 Pendy Plastic Products v Pluspunkt Handelsgesellschaft [1982] ECR 2733. 
See, however, Corte Suprema di Cassazione (23 May 2008) 13425/2008 where the Italian 
Supreme Court held that the verification of whether the documents instituting the procee-
dings had been duly served had to be answered according to the law of the Member State of 
origin, and not the Member State where recognition is sought, provided that the procedure 
in the Member State of origin conforms to international public policy, in particular the right 
to a fair hearing.
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sion where he was notified of the elements of the claim, had the oppor-
tunity to arrange for his defence and has made an appearance before the 
original court.50 
The ECJ initially held that the document must necessarily be served 
before an enforceable judgment can be obtained against the defendant. 
The Court held explicitly that ‘the possibility of having recourse, at a later 
stage, to a legal remedy against a judgment given in default of appea-
rance, which has already become enforceable, cannot constitute an equ-
ally effective alternative to a defence in the proceedings before the first 
judgment is delivered’.51 Participation only at a later stage in the procee-
dings apparently caused a disadvantage to the defendant. Brussels I stri-
kes a different balance.52 In contrast to the Brussels Convention, Brussels 
I prevents the refusal of recognition or enforcement when the defendant 
failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was 
possible for him to do so. The inactive defendant is prevented from rai-
sing his absence in the proceedings at the stage of recognition and enfor-
cement. The Greek Civil Supreme Court therefore held that the change of 
wording prevented a Greek company from invoking an irregular service of 
documents since the French judgment was delivered upon the company 
in Greece and the Greek company had the right to lodge an appeal within 
two months from the service of the judgment.53
Brussels I aims to strive towards the result that the check on the 
procedure is as far as possible performed in the Member State where 
the original proceedings took place. Brussels I perceives the possibility 
of obtaining a legal remedy as equivalent to the organisation of a defen-
ce at the beginning of the proceedings.54 Whether the reasoning holds 
water or not, it is not necessarily incompatible with the standards of art 
6 ECHR which assess the proceedings as a whole.55 One might wonder 
whether the failure to lodge an appeal can be seen as an implicit waiver 
of the right to participate in the proceedings. In ASML Netherlands, the 
ECJ relied explicitly on the case law of the ECtHR to rule that the aim 
of simplifying the formalities with a view to their rapid and simple reco-
50 Case C-172/91 Sonntag [1993] ECR I-1963.
51 Case C-123/91 Minalmet [1992] ECR-5661, para 19.
52 G. Biagioni, ‘Aspetti evolutivi nella disciplina comunitaria dell’esecuzione delle sentenze 
straniere: i regolamenti (CE) n 44/2001 e n 805/2004’ in  G Carella, Cooperazione giudi-
ziaria ed efficacia delle sentenze: problematiche di diritto internazionale ed europeo (Cacucci 
Editore, Bari 2007) 199-213. 
53 Άρειος Πάγος (Greek Civil Supreme Court) (2 January 2009) 7/2009. In a similar vein, 
Dutch Hoge Raad (29 September 2006) AX3080; BGH (22 July 2004) IX ZB 2/03; BGH (12 
December 2007) XII ZB 240/05.
54 Magnus & Mankowski (n 20) 592.
55 In EU courts: Case C-341/04 Eurofood [2006] ECR I-3813.
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gnition and enforcement cannot be attained by undermining in any way 
the right to a fair hearing. In order for the defendant to have the oppor-
tunity to bring proceedings enabling him to assert his rights, he should 
be able to acquaint himself with the grounds of the default judgment in 
order to challenge them effectively. Mere knowledge of a judgment does 
not suffice. The defendant must have been aware of the contents of that 
decision, which presupposes that it was served on him. The defendant is 
not required to take additional steps that go beyond normal diligence in 
the defence of his rights, for example steps to become acquainted with 
the contents of the original judgment. Translation of the documents in 
a language that the defendant understands is necessary,56 although the 
defendant cannot invoke the failure to translate the document instituting 
the proceedings when he understands the legal nature of the document 
and ensures legal representation in the Member State of origin.57 The 
standard of art 6 is therefore incorporated in the notion ‘possible’. It will 
only be possible for a defendant to have challenged the decision in the 
Member State of origin ‘if he was in fact acquainted with its contents, 
because it was served on him in sufficient time to enable him to arrange 
for his defence before the courts of the State in which the judgment was 
given.’58
The period of reasonable time starts to run when the notice has been 
served upon the defendant. The ECJ held in Klomps that the question of 
whether the defendant was left sufficient time to arrange for his defence 
was a factual appraisal of the circumstances of the case.59 The review in 
the Member State of origin that the documents instituting the proceedin-
gs had been duly served did not release the court in the Member State 
addressed from the duty to examine whether the defendant was afforded 
sufficient time and opportunity to arrange for his defence. The review of 
both the original court as well as the court addressed would make sense 
since the latter court is often in the best position to appreciate the factual 
circumstances surrounding the possibility of an individual domiciled in 
its territory to prepare a defence. The German Bundesgerichtshof held 
that the defendant had been afforded sufficient time to prepare his defen-
ce when the writ had been served upon him five days before the hearing, 
since a second hearing had been held five weeks later.60 In addition, the 
English Court of Appeal held five weeks to be sufficient time to prepare a 
56 Case 305/88 Lancray SA v Peters und Sickert KG [1990] ECR I-2725.
57 Case C-420/07 Apostolides v Orams [2009] ECR I-0000. Note that at stake was the failu-
re to translate the documents instituting the proceedings from Greek into English and not 
the final judgment.
58 Case C-283/05 ASML Netherlands [2006] ECR I-12041, para 49.
59 Case 166/80 Klomps [1981] ECR 1593.
60 BGH (6 October 2005) IX ZB 360/02.
39CYELP 6 [2010] 23-51
defence, even when the defendant was required to give notice of appea-
rance within two weeks after being served the writ.61
Public policy and the right to a fair trial
Despite its numerical order, art 34 (1) Brussels I fulfils a residual 
function. It can only come into play when the other grounds for non-re-
cognition or enforcement are not applicable. It is in principle for a Mem-
ber State to decide which rules belong to its public policy.62 However, art 
34 provides that a judgment shall not be recognised. A Member State is 
therefore bound not to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment whenever 
it is manifestly contrary to the public policy of that Member State. The 
framing of art 34 (1) in the wording of an obligation is slightly surprising. 
A Member State will not hesitate to refuse to recognise a decision when it 
manifestly violates its public order.
In the past decade, under the influence of Union law, public policy 
has moved away from being a purely national conception.63 Due to the 
division of competences between the Union and its Member States, eco-
nomic and monetary provisions will constitute the core of that European 
public policy.64 The ECJ held in Eco Swiss that art 101 TFEU should be 
categorised as a matter of public policy, whose non-observance could 
lead to the setting aside of an arbitral award.65 The Court directly placed 
art 81 in the category of public policy within the meaning of the New York 
Convention on Arbitration (1958). The Court recalled that, unlike natio-
nal judges in the courts of the Member States, arbitrators could not make 
a preliminary reference to Luxembourg. The same argument can be made 
with respect to judges in third countries. On the other hand, it is not 
sure whether competition law enters the conception of public policy in an 
intra Union situation. The Court held in Renault v Maxicar that not every 
misapplication of Union law by another Member State would justify the 
resort to the public policy exception. Without entering into a discussion 
61 TSN Kunststoffrecycling GmbH v Jurgens [2002] EWCA Civ 11.
62 R Moura Ramos, ‘Public Policy in the Framework of the Brussels Convention’ (2000) II 
Ybk Private Intl L, 25-39.
63 C Liebscher, ‘Arbitral & Judicial Decision: European Public Policy after Eco Swiss’ (1999) 
10 American Review of International Arbitration 81-94; J Basedow, ‘Die Verselbständigung 
des europäischen ordre public’ in M Coester, D Martiny and K Prinz von Sachsen Gessap-
he (eds), Privatrecht in Europe, Festschrift für Hans Jürgen Sonnenberger (Verlag CH Beck, 
München 2004) 291-319 ; J Basedow, ‘Recherches sur la formation de l’ordre public eu-
ropéen dans la jurisprudence’ in  Le droit international privé: esprit et méthodes. Mélanges 
en l’honneur de Paul Lagarde (Dalloz, Paris 2005) 55-74. 
64 G Karydis, ‘Ordre public dans l’ordre juridique communautaire’ (2002) 38 Revue Trime-
strielle de Droit Européen 1, 12.
65 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055.
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whether art 102 TFEU had been correctly applied or not in French courts, 
the ECJ did not allow Italian courts to review the French decision. Rena-
ult v Maxicar should be welcomed. With regard to Union law, it is the ECJ 
that enjoys the power of interpretation. It is not for Italian courts to verify 
the compliance of French courts with the TFEU. Member States should 
presume that the courts of another Member State have correctly applied 
Union law. Therefore, the dogmatic framework of the Treaties requires 
that a failure of France to comply with its obligations under Union law 
should be established by the ECJ and not by an Italian court. 
Member States are, in the implementation of Union law, bound to 
comply with fundamental rights.66 The right to a fair trial has been re-
cognised as a fundamental principle of Union law.67 It is beyond doubt 
that the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments pronounced in 
another Member State fall within the scope of Union law. The obligation 
would therefore also cover the public policy exception. The decision to 
enforce a judgment that has been pronounced in a Member State without 
observance of the guarantees of a fair trial does not constitute a separate 
infringement of Union law. The duty of compliance with the right to a fair 
trial applies only with respect to the enforcement proceedings themselves 
and not with the initial proceedings. Contrary to the wording of art 34, 
the application of the public policy exception remains a discretion of the 
Member States. Even when a breach with art 6 ECHR is manifest, art 34 
(1) seems to allow, and not to require, the non-recognition of the original 
judgment.68 An obligation would be at odds with the principle of the free 
movement of judgments that requires that a defendant challenges the 
original decision principally and primarily in the Member State of origin. 
From the ECJ case law, it can be concluded that fundamental rights are 
used to cast light on the meaning of a private international law concept, 
but are not in themselves the source of obligation.69
The effects of Brussels I would be nullified if the free movement of 
judgments could be distorted by the wide use of the public policy excep-
tion. Union law therefore not only interferes positively in the public policy 
of Member States by introducing a Union minimum, but also negatively 
by imposing a maximum. The ECJ formulated in Krombach that in order 
66 Case 260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT) [1991] ECR I-2925; Case C-299/95 
Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629; Case C-309/96 Annibaldi v Sindaco del Comune di Guido-
nia [1997] ECR I-7493; Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011; Case C-276/01 
Steffensen [2003] ECR I-3735.
67 Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417; Joined Cases 
C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission [2000] ECR I-1; 
Case C-341/04 Eurofood  [2006] ECR I-3813.
68 Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935, para 44.
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for the prohibition of any review of the foreign judgment as to its 
substance to be observed, the infringement would have to constitute 
a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal 
order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right reco-
gnised as being fundamental within that legal order.70 
Moreover, the relationship between the national courts is governed 
by mutual trust.71 It appears that the free movement of judgments would 
be frustrated if the courts of an enforcing State would be required to carry 
out a detailed review of whether the procedures in the Member State of 
origin had complied with art 6 ECHR.72 Restraint is therefore appropriate.
Substantive public policy
Although art 36 prohibits review of the substance of a decision, art 
34 (1) has a substantive limb.73 The enforcement of a foreign decision 
might be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the state in which 
recognition is sought. The legal divergences between the Member States 
in the area of civil or commercial obligations will however rarely be that 
large to necessitate recourse to public policy.74  
Another reason to trigger the application of substantive public po-
licy would be when the original judgment has been obtained by fraud. 
However, since the recognising court is prevented from entering into an 
assessment regarding the merits of the judgment, this applies only to 
fraud that is discovered after the original judgment was rendered and 
when the defendant has no possibilities of challenging that judgment in 
the Member State of origin. The duty to challenge the original decision 
before the court initially seized does not apply when the new facts are 
beyond the control of those courts. The French Cour de Cassation thus 
refused to accept a plea of fraud since the defendant did not demonstrate 
that the factual incorrectness of the applicant’s claim was unknown to 
69 Fawcett (n 14) 24.
70 Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935, para 37.
71 Case C-116/02 Gasser [2003] ECR I-14693; Case C-159/02 Turner [2004] ECR I-3565; 
Case C-185/07 West Tankers [2009] ECR I-0000.
72 Maronier v Larmer [2002] EWCA Civ 774.
73 The German Bundesgerichtshof has accepted that enforcement can be refused when the 
disputed obligation has already been fulfilled. This is at daggers drawn with the prohibition 
as to review on the substance. BGH (14 March 2007) XII ZB 174/04. See critically B Hess, 
‘Die Unzulässigkeit materiellrechtlicher Einwendungen im Beschwerdeverfahren nach Art. 
43 ff. EuGVVO’ (2008) 28 IPRax 25-30.
74 Magnus & Mankowski (n 20) 568.
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him during the original proceedings.75 It therefore appears that the Ger-
man Bundesgerichtshof acted in breach of its obligations under Union 
law when it refused to enforce a Danish default judgment that took into 
account false submissions allegedly made by the applicant. The docu-
ments instituting the proceedings had been properly served upon the 
German defendant and the defendant should have attacked the factual 
incorrectness of the statements of the applicant in the Member State of 
origin and not in Germany.76
Procedural public policy
To return to the holding of the ECJ in Krombach, the Court reco-
gnises that the violation of the right to a fair hearing, as a fundamental 
right, can be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State 
in which recognition is sought. Since art 34 (2) already provided safe-
guards as regard the proceedings in the Member State of origin, such 
a procedural limb of art 34 (1) was not obvious.77 Krombach concerned 
the death of a French national while residing in the holiday house of her 
stepfather, Krombach, in Germany. Despite repeated protests of Bam-
berski, the father of the deceased, the German public prosecutor did not 
press any criminal charges against Krombach, on the grounds that there 
was insufficient evidence of a criminal act. Bamberksi managed to trig-
ger criminal proceedings in France and subsequently joined the criminal 
proceedings as a civil party. Risking being taking into custody, Krombach 
refused to appear before the French criminal court. Krombach was held 
to be in contempt of court and with regard to both the civil and the crimi-
nal proceedings prohibited from representation by a lawyer. Bamberski 
subsequently sought to enforce the civil judgment in Germany. The ECJ 
held that recourse to public policy is open in extreme cases where gua-
rantees laid down in the Member State of origin and the ECHR have been 
insufficient to protect the defendant from a manifest breach of his right 
to defend himself before the courts of the Member State of origin.78 Hence, 
75 Cour de Cassation, 29 January 2002. B. Ancel, ‘Annotation to CdC 29 January 2002’ 
(2002) 91 Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 573-577.
76 BGH (6 May 2004) IX ZB 43/03.
77 Magnus & Mankowski (n 20) 574. 
78 A Lowenfeld, ‘Jurisdiction, Enforcement, Public Policy and Res Judicata: The Krombach 
Case’ in T Einhorn and K Siehr (eds), International Cooperation Through Private International 
Law: Essays in Memory of Peter E Nygh, (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2004) 229-248. The 
German refusal to extradite Krombach and the refusal to enforce the civil part of the French 
judgment did not ultimately benefit Krombach. In 2009, he was abducted from Germany 
and found tied up before a courthouse in Mulhouse (France). French authorities intend to 
re-open the criminal proceedings. See <http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/dr-krombachs-fi-
nal-contribution-to-the-european-judicial-area> accessed on 7 March 2010.
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a mere difference between the two national laws is not enough. The laws 
of the Member State of origin must be at variance to an unacceptable 
degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought 
inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle.
Gambazzi concerned a Swiss lawyer working for a US undertaking. 
After the bankruptcy of the US undertaking, several creditors brought 
claims against a number of persons, including Gambazzi. The English 
court ordered Gambazzi to disclose information regarding his assets and 
also to submit certain documents relating to the main proceedings. Gam-
bazzi unsuccessfully challenged the disclosure order on the grounds that 
the disclosure of some of the data requested would make him liable to 
criminal prosecution in Switzerland, and ultimately refused to comply. 
The English court held him in contempt of court and excluded him from 
the proceedings. Under English procedural law, the court will, in such 
circumstances, take over the claim of the applicants without entering 
into an analysis as to its merits. A default judgment was awarded aga-
inst Gambazzi, of a sum approximately equivalent to EUR 300 million. 
The ECtHR declared Gambazzi’s complaint to be manifestly ill founded.79 
When confronted with an action for enforcement, the Milan Court of 
Appeals referred the question for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. The 
ECJ held that it was for the court before which recognition is sought 
to establish whether the defendant had the opportunity to raise all the 
factual and legal issues which, in his view, could support his application 
and whether those issues were examined as to the merits, in full accor-
dance with the adversarial principle, or whether, on the contrary, he was 
able to ask only limited questions. The ECJ left it to the national court to 
decide in the light of a comprehensive assessment of the proceedings and 
of all the circumstances as a whole whether the exclusion of a defendant 
from the proceedings on the grounds of non-compliance with a procedu-
ral order constituted a manifest and disproportionate infringement of the 
right to be heard.80
The enforcement of a foreign decision may in some circumstances be 
an obstacle to the right of access to justice.81 The national case law concer-
ning art 34 (1) Brussels I has, however, mainly evolved around breaches 
of the right to a fair hearing that could, due its strict requirements, not 
be a ground for refusal under art 34 (2). For example, the Court of Appe-
al of England and Wales refused to enforce a Dutch judgment that had 
79 G Cuniberti, ‘Debarment from Defending, Default Judgments and Public Policy in Euro-
pe’(2009) University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper Series 2009-09, 8. 
80 Case C-394/07 Gambazzi [2009] ECR I-0000.
81 H Meidanis, ‘Three Greek Cases on the Brussels Convention’ (2006) VIII Ybk Private Intl 
L, 281, 283.
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been delivered after the proceedings were revived by the applicant after 
twelve years of inactivity without informing the defendant.82 In its turn, 
the French Cour de Cassation refused to enforce an English judgment be-
cause neither the decision nor any other document stated any reasons on 
which the decision was based, but instead relied upon a rule of English 
procedure that exempts the court from stating reasons when it agrees 
with the substance of the applicant’s claim.83 The Greek Civil Supreme 
Court refused to enforce an English determination of judicial expenses as 
it held the costs incurred to be excessive and disproportionate in relation 
to the value of the subject matter, in particular since they were more than 
20,000 times higher than the judicial expenses would have been had the 
case been tried in Greece.84 In addition, an incorrect translation of the 
method and periods of limitation to lodge an appeal in the Member State 
of origin could prevent recognition if it amounted to depriving the defen-
dant of the opportunity to defend himself in the Member State of origin.85 
The ECJ has provided Member States with a certain margin of appre-
ciation to establish whether the proceedings before the original court 
have been in conformity with the right to a fair hearing. The additional 
check over the procedure is, even in the common European justice area, 
justifiable. Cross-border disputes are, due to differences in language, 
procedures for the service of document, geographical distance and un-
familiarity with the procedures before the original court, far more likely 
to impact upon the right to a fair hearing. The ECJ itself seems to have 
recognised that, with regard to weaker parties, the geographical distance 
as such may be an obstacle to the effective enforcement of civil rights.86 
Although national courts have only made restrictive use of public policy,87 
82 Maronier v Larmer  [2002] EWCA Civ 774. X Kramer, ‘Enforcement under the Brussels 
Convention: Procedural Public Policy and the Influence of Article 6 ECHR’ (2003) Intl Lis 
16-20.
83 Cour de Cassation (22 October 2008) 06-15577. See also Cour de Cassation (17 January 
2006) 03-14483 where the CdC held that French courts had a certain margin in establishi-
ng whether the duty to state reasons had been complied with. Even though the judgment 
itself did not state reasons, the requirement was complied with when the applicant in the 
attachment to the original judgment produced the original writ of summons and the parties’ 
submission, including a submission from the defendants’ CEO acknowledging the existence 
of a debt.
84 Άρειος Πάγος (17 November 2006) 1829/2006.
85 Sad Najwyzszy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Polish Supreme Court) (28 March 2007) II CSK 
533/2006. Note that the case was not decided under Brussels I, but under a similar provi-
sion in the Lugano Convention.
86 Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano [2000] ECR I-4941; Case C-168/05 Mosta-
za Claro [2006] ECR I-10421; Case C-243/08 Pannon [2009] ECR I-0000; Case C-40/08 
Asturcom [2009] ECR I-0000.
87 Sad Najwyzszy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (21 March 2007) I CSK 434/06 (dismissal of 
appeal due to absence of the appellant at hearing); Banco Nacional de Comercio (11 October 
2007) EWHC 2322; BGH (17 June 2009) XII ZB 82/09 (Grant of retrospective child support 
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the cases discussed above have demonstrated that an additional check 
for compliance with the right to a fair trial remains necessary. Not only 
have the procedural laws of the Member States yet to converge to a degree 
that would preclude a decision from one Member State infringing a fun-
damental principle in another Member State, cross-border litigation may 
by definition already put a strain on the right of a defendant to effectively 
participate in the proceedings.
Art 6 ECHR and the free movement of judgments
The ECJ draws inspiration from art 6 ECHR when interpreting Bru-
ssels I. That influence goes beyond the verification of compliance with the 
right to a fair trial under the heading of public policy. In some circum-
stances, violation of the right to a fair trial would have as a consequence 
that the decision does not benefit from the free movement of judgments 
since the decision will not qualify as a ‘judgment’ for the purpose of Bru-
ssels I. In other circumstances, the absence of one of the parties during 
the original proceedings may constitute grounds for non-recognition, 
while public policy may be used to combat the remaining violations of the 
right to a fair trial. Fundamental rights have been used to give shape to 
PIL concepts, but not as an autonomous source of obligations as such. 
The ECJ differs in this respect from the ECtHR, which in Pelligrini requ-
ired on the basis of the Convention the non-enforcement of a judgment 
rendered in a non-Contracting State in violation of art 6 ECHR.
Art 6 ECHR only imposes minimum standards. Art 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union88 has codified the right to 
a fair trial in the constitutional architecture of the Union. Although the 
Charter is addressed only to the institutions, it may prove to be a useful 
guiding tool. The text of the EU Charter goes further than art 6 ECHR in 
that it explicitly protects the possibility of being advised, defended and 
represented, as well as the right to legal aid for those who lack sufficient 
resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to 
justice. In addition, cases such as Gambazzi, where the ECtHR found 
the allegation to be manifestly ill founded, but the ECJ did not preclude 
Italy from refusing the English judgment on the grounds that it contra-
vened Italian public policy since the English judge had failed to observe 
the requirements of a fair trial as interpreted in Italy, suggest that the 
under conditions not permissible in Germany; exclusion of review as to the merits of the 
original decision); French Cour de Cassation (14 October 2009) 08-14489 (service of origi-
nal judgment upon legal representation in the Member State of origin, instead of upon the 
defendant).
88 Art 6 (1) TFEU attributes to the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal value as 
the Treaties.
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EU affords in general higher protection of the right to a fair trial than the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
In its Green Paper on the revision of Brussels I, the European Com-
mission proposed to abolish the exequatur completely.89 The deletion of 
any administrative check in the country where recognition is sought wo-
uld mean that Member States, as soon as the judicial decision qualifies 
as a judgment within the scope of the Regulation, does not have any 
means to refuse the recognition or enforcement of a decision not rende-
red in conformity with the right to a fair trial. The Commission aims to 
reduce the intermediate measures which are still necessary to enable 
the recognition and enforcement of a judgment. The enforcement of ci-
vil judgments still requires a lot of time and resources. The Heidelberg 
Report on the application of Brussels I indeed provides ground to que-
stion the exequatur. In Hungary, an exequatur can be obtained by the 
applicant in a couple of hours provided he provides all the necessary 
documents, but the procedure can take up to seven months in Greece.90 
Such long delays in enforcement are in themselves questionable in the 
light of the right to a fair trial. The concerns apply with more force given 
that an exequatur is nearly never challenged and, even when challenged, 
applications are rarely successful.
The Commission draws attention to the Regulation creating a Eu-
ropean Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims. The European En-
forcement order abolishes the exequatur completely and replaces it by 
a control in the Member State of origin.91 The regulation itself sets out 
procedural safeguards for the service of documents, and a special re-
view should remedy extraordinary situations where the defendant was 
not served personally in a manner that amounted to a deprivation of 
the right to arrange for his defence or where he could not object to the 
claim by reason of force majeur.92 Refusal of enforcement in the Member 
State addressed is still possible in the event of an irreconcilable, earlier 
judgment.93 However, the right to a fair trial encompasses more than the 
due service of documents affording the defendant the possibility to pre-
pare a defence. One has to recall only art 47 EU Charter that guarantees 
access to legal aid for those who lack sufficient resources. In the area of 
uncontested claims, concerns of fundamental rights will play a smaller 
role since the defendant concedes the existence of a claim. Requirements 
aimed at protecting the adversarial nature of a trial will not be violated if 
89 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters COM 
(2009) 175 final.
90 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (n 24) 130-131.
91 Crifò (n 44) 61-102.
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the defendant does not seek to contest the substance of the claim of the 
applicant.
Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and co-operation in matters relating to main-
tenance obligations abolishes the exequatur in both contested and un-
contested claims for Member States that have ratified the 2007 Protocol 
to the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obliga-
tions. The regulation provides procedural guarantees for the service of 
documents but also for the right to legal aid. The protection of the rights 
of defence is guaranteed via a special procedure that may challenge the 
judgment in the Member State of origin. The Commission justified the 
absence of the exequatur on the grounds of the small number of pro-
blematic judgments, the possibility of review a posteriori, the protection 
of the rights of defence and the harmonisation of the rules to determine 
the applicable law. The a posteriori review clause does not contain any 
express reference to public policy. The argument that uniform rules exist 
in determining the applicable law does not convince as a reason for the 
deletion of public policy since it cannot be excluded that the law that 
is identified by the common rules violates a fundamental principle of 
another Member State. Nevertheless, the abolition of the exequatur in 
Regulation 4/2009 appears to be a fact. The Union ratified the Protocol 
on behalf of all Member States, save Denmark and the United Kingdom, 
on 8 April 2010.94 The Protocol has not entered into force yet, but the 
Union has made a unilateral declaration stipulating it will provisionally 
apply the Protocol from 18 June 2011, which will coincide with the date 
of application of Regulation 4/2009.95
As the ECJ has consistently held, Brussels I aims to strike a fair ba-
lance between the free movement of judgments and the protection of the 
right to be able to conduct a proper defence.96 The right to a fair trial sho-
uld not be sacrificed on the altar of administrative efficiency. The right to 
a fair trial is not only guaranteed via procedural law, but is derived from 
the context of the legal system as a whole. National rules outside proce-
dural law can interfere with the ability to prepare a proper defence. Gam-
92 Art 12-19 Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for 
Uncontested Claims.
93 Art 21 European Enforcement Order.
94 Council Decision 2009/941 on the conclusion by the European Community of the Ha-
gue Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations.
95 The declaration is accessible on the website of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=1065&disp=resdn> 
accessed on 20 May 2010.
96 Case 49/84 Debaecker v Plouvier [1985] ECR 1779.
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bazzi invoked the possibility of criminal prosecution under Swiss law as 
justification for the refusal to comply with an English procedural order. 
It is exactly these disturbances between the co-ordination of laws that 
make the public policy of the Member State addressed a useful tool. An 
exclusive control in the Member State of origin, even when accompanied 
with minimum standards,97 is inadequate. In the light of the large majo-
rity of enforcement orders that are executed without a challenge, and the 
small possibility of successfully challenging a foreign decision, it would 
make sense to reconsider the exequatur. Foreign judgments would have 
the same force as national judgments and private parties would be spa-
red the burden of having to apply for an exequatur. The numerous nati-
onal and ECJ cases discussed have demonstrated that despite uniform 
rules relating to jurisdiction, applicable law and the common minimum 
safeguard of art 6 ECHR judgments pronounced in one Member State 
can still manifestly shock the public order of another Member State. A 
possibility for review, even merely a posteriori, should therefore remain 
in the Member State addressed, and not only before the court originally 
seized.  
The gradual simplification of the requirements to execute a judgment 
pronounced in another Member State reflects the deepening European 
integration. Nevertheless, the ECJ has continued to place emphasis on 
the right to a fair hearing, in particular the right to be able to effectively 
prepare a defence. The ECJ seems in its case law to provide for a higher 
level of protection of the right to a fair hearing than the ECtHR. It is do-
ubtful whether the elimination of the exequatur and the impossibility of 
any review in the Member State addressed is compatible with the high 
level of protection of the right to a fair trial that the ECJ has developed in 
its case law.98 One only has to recall a case like Klomps where a decision 
of the court in the Member State of origin that documents instituting the 
proceedings duly served upon the defendant did not release the court in 
the Member State addressed from the duty, which implied an appraisal 
of factual circumstances, to verify whether the documents were served in 
such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence.99 The complexity 
of trans-border litigation as well as the sometimes hampering co-ordina-
tion between the legal systems of the Member States would justify control 
97 A Borrás, ‘Le droit international privé communautaire: réalités, problèmes et perspecti-
ves d’avenir’ (2005) 317 Recueil des Cours 323, 453.
98 P Schlosser, ‘The Abolition of Exequatur Proceedings – Including Public Policy Review’ 
(2010) 2 IPRax 101-104; P Beaumont and M Johnston, ‘Abolition of Exequatur in Brussels 
I: Is a Public Policy Defence Necessary for the Protection of Human Rights?’ (2010) 2 IPRax 
105-110.
99 Case 166/80 Klomps, para 15. Note, however, that this statement was made in the con-
text of art 27 (2) Brussels Convention (art 34 (2) Brussels I), which would be deleted if the 
exequatur were abolished.
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over the foreign decision. The free movement of judgments would in such 
circumstances not work fundamentally differently from the free move-
ment of goods or services. In the context of art 34 TFEU, it is also for the 
Member State of origin to determine whether goods have been lawfully 
produced, but the free circulation of goods may under certain conditions 
be refused by the host Member State on the basis of public policy consi-
derations. With regard to the free movement of services, the ECJ held in 
Omega that the perception of public policy evolves over time and differs 
from Member State to Member State.100 What may shock the public order 
in Germany may be acceptable in the United Kingdom. This statement 
is not only true with regard to services or goods, but could also have 
been said about the free movement of judgments. This applies even more 
tenaciously when public policy in the context of the free movement of 
judgments has been used to safeguard a fundamental right. In the light 
of the strain that administrative expediency may place upon the protec-
tion of the right to a fair trial, one should be wary about taking the free 
movement of judgments beyond the free movement of goods and services.
Conclusion
Brussels I maintains a very liberal regime for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign decisions. To counterbalance the limited possibili-
ties for Member States not to give effect to judicial decisions, due regard 
should be given to the requirements of a fair trial. A fair balance should 
be struck between the free movement of judgments in civil and commer-
cial cases and the protection of the rights of defence. Art 6 ECHR provides 
procedural minimum standards that have been used in the ECJ case law 
as a useful guiding tool.
In Pellegrini, the ECtHR held that when a Contracting State is con-
fronted with a judicial decision from a non-Contracting State, the natio-
nal court is under the obligation to duly satisfy that the original procee-
dings fulfilled the guarantees of art 6 ECHR. The judgment is most likely 
limited to a judicial decision originating in a non-Contracting State since 
it can be presumed that a judgment rendered in a Contracting State 
complies with the standards of art 6. Moreover, a private party can lodge 
a complaint to the ECtHR. The question of refusal of recognition or en-
forcement is a matter left to the public policy of the Contracting States.
The standards of art. 6 merely function as a minimum. The ECJ has 
used the right to a fair trial as a guiding tool in its case law. The right to 
a fair trial sheds light on notions of PIL instead of being an autonomous 
source of obligations. The approach of the ECJ differs in this respect from 
100 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609.
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the attitude of the ECtHR in Pelligrini. The case law of the Court gene-
rally offers a higher level of protection than art 6 ECHR. The ECJ has not 
limited the right to a fair hearing to public policy. It held that the liberal 
system of recognition and enforcement required that a defendant should 
be able to submit every point of law that he deems to be relevant. Not 
every judicial decision will therefore qualify as a judgment. The effective 
participation of both parties in adversarial proceedings and the instituti-
onal independence of the court are therefore already partly safeguarded 
by the exclusion of judgments where the court does not decide an issue 
on its own authority or where one of the parties has no possibility to par-
ticipate in the proceedings.
Of significant importance is art 34 (2) that safeguards the right to 
an adversarial proceeding by providing as ground for non-recognition 
the failure to duly serve the documents instituting the proceedings in a 
manner allowing the defendant the effective possibility to prepare his de-
fence. Art 34 (2) does not protect the passive defendant. The possibility to 
invoke the irregular service of documents is forfeited when the defendant 
failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment in the Member 
State of origin when it was possible for him to do so. The fact that the 
court of origin ruled that the defendant was afforded an effective possibi-
lity to prepare his defence does not relieve the Member State addressed 
from the duty to conduct the same analysis. That exception to the general 
principle of the free movement of judgments is justified since the analysis 
is often a factual appraisal where the Member State addressed may be in 
a better position to fully appreciate the factual circumstances than the 
Member State of origin.
Public policy can be used as a tool of last resort. The national court 
is however prohibited from reviewing the merits of the case. The test of 
public policy would otherwise create an additional possibility of appeal. 
The infringement of the public policy of a Member State in which enfor-
cement is sought would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of 
law regarded as essential in the forum or of a right recognised as being 
fundamental within that legal order. A Member State thus may review 
compliance of the right to a fair trial under the heading public policy. In-
stead of giving direct application, fundamental rights are subsumed in a 
PIL doctrine. However, the mere fact that the court of origin protects the 
right to a fair trial in a different manner, or strikes a different balance, 
is not enough. An example of a manifest breach of a fundamental rule 
is the exclusion of participation or legal representation in a civil procee-
ding connected to a criminal action when the defendant fails to make an 
appearance in the criminal proceedings because he runs the risk of being 
deprived of his liberty.
The proposal of the Commission to abolish the exequatur should 
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therefore not be unconditionally embraced. Substantial differences rema-
in between national procedures and applicable standards of the right to 
a fair trial. The complexity of transnational litigation as a result of diffe-
rences in procedure and language may in itself already raise concerns 
about fair trial. However, since the exequatur is 19 times out of 20 not 
challenged, good reasons exist to consider its abolishment. An ex posteri-
ori review on the initiative of the defendant might be a middle way. As the 
numerous cases analysed have demonstrated, the right to a fair trial can 
only be effectively guaranteed when such control can be conducted in the 
country where recognition is sought.
